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FARM FORECLOSURE MORATORIA AND 
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Home Building & Loan Association v. BlaisdelL the 1933 decision upholding 
Minnesota's moratorium law, is one of the standard cases in modern constitutional 
texts and casebooks. From one perspective, the decision invites a conventional/ega/ 
analysis of the meaning of the contract clause and the degree to which the Supreme 
Court should and does defer to legislative decisions about economic matters, espe-
cially during a crisis such as the Great Depression. One supposes that most constitu-
tional teachers are content to discuss these questions, while ignoring the "legislative 
merits" of moratoria. We think that a broader approach is preferable, so that stu-
dents become aware of the possibility that Blaisdell was a hard case factually as well 
as legally. 
Those who agree with our pedagogical strategy may wish to peruse the following 
report, published in response to recent proposals for farm mongage foreclosure 
moratoria. 
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SUMMARY 
Minnesota agricultural policymakers have been presented re-
cently with a variety of proposals for farm relief. Foreclosure mora-
toria represent one set of proposals. This paper discusses the intent 
and potential effects of three types of moratoria: voluntary 
nonforeclosure, a conditional moratorium, and a mandatory mora-
torium. Moratorium proposals generally seek to halt or restrict the 
rise in farm foreclosures in the state. Another purpose of a state 
imposed moratorium is to "send a signal" to the federal government 
that something must be done about farm problems. The economic 
impacts on farm lenders and farm borrowers are discussed. Indirect 
effects on the nonfarm rural economy are briefly analyzed. 
Farm foreclosure moratoria in the 1930's had adverse effects 
on credit availability and a modest impact on the rate of farm fail-
ures. Economic conditions today are quite different. The analysis 
suggests that the following economic impacts may result from im-
position of farm foreclosure moratoria. The general direction (but 
not the magnitude) of each change has been deduced. Table 1 sum-
marizes the analysis. 
Impacts on farm borrowers. A moratorium allows a farmer to 
use loaned capital for the period specified by the legislation, 
whether or not the farmer is making payments on the loan. 
1. The flow of funds to the farm sector may be reduced as 
lenders reallocate resources in an attempt to reduce losses. 
2. Interest costs are expected to rise as lenders attempt to 
maintain earnings at acceptable levels. 
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3. Some high-risk, creditworthy borrowers will be refused ad-
ditional credit as lenders reevaluate risk of default. 
Impacts on lenders. A moratorium restricts a lender's right to 
recover capital by foreclosing on nonperforming loans. 
1. Lenders will experience a continuation of lower earnings 
on capital tied-up in nonperforming farm loans. 
2. Imposition of a moratorium during a period of declining 
collateral asset values may result in capital losses. The ef-
fects of capital losses on farm lenders will vary due to dif-
ferences in levels of capitalization and provisions for loss 
sharing. 
Additional impacts. 
1. The effects of a moratorium on farm land prices is [sic] 
uncertain. 
2. Moratorium legislation which seals off negotiation pos-
sibilities may undermine lender/borrower efforts to de-
velop alternatives to foreclosure. 
3. Some lenders may be expected to increase or accelerate 
foreclosure activities in advance of anticipated moratorium 
legislation. 
4. Moratorium legislation is an effective signal to the extent 
that the intended signal is received by the appropriate 
parties. 
In summary, a farm foreclosure moratorium would have differ-
ent effects upon different participants in farm credit markets. It is 
important that public policy actions be evaluated in light of these 
differences. 
FARM FORECLOSURE MORATORIA: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
I. Intent of a Farm Foreclosure Moratorium 
a. The basic intent of a moratorium on farm foreclosures is 
to stop foreclosure proceedings for a given period (see 
Appendix 1, Minn. Stat. Ch. 580.02, 1985). Farmers 
would gain temporary relief from their financial obliga-
tions. Also, a signal would be sent to Congress, lenders, 
borrowers, or others drawing attention to the severity of 
the financial situation in the agricultural sector. To the 
extent that the moratorium is an attempt to allow for re-
covery, relatively rapid improvement in the farm sector 
(external adjustment) or sufficient improvement in the fi-
nancial condition of the firm [sic] (internal adjustment) 
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Table 1. Summary of the Impacts of a Farm Foreclosure 
Moratorium. 
Voluntary Conditional Mandatory 
Nonforeclosure Moratorium Moratorium Moratorium 
(I) Impact on Lenders 
(a) Foregone income potential potential yes 
(b) Reduction in profits potential potential yes 
(c) Reduction in equity capital potential potential yes 
(2) Impact on Borrowers 
(a) Credit access (farm) potential reduction reduction 
reduction 
(b) Credit access (nonfarm) potential increase increase 
increase 
(c) Credit costs (farm) potential selective selective 
increase increase increase 
(d) Credit costs (nonfarm) uncertain uncertain uncertain 
(3) Impact On Lender/Borrower Relationships 
(a) Future relationships potential uncertain harmful 
improvement 
(b) Court costs unlikely to increase increase 
increase 
(c) "Buy time" yes yes yes 
(4) Other Impacts 
(a) Anticipatory foreclosures none possible more likely 
(b) Post moratorium foreclosure activity potential potential potential 
increase increase increase 
(c) Legal aspects few most complicated 
complicated 
(d) Compatibility with other actions major major major 
consideration consideration consideration 
(e) Land markets (land prices) uncertain uncertain uncertain 
must take place. To the extent that a moratorium sends a 
"signal," it is important to assess whether the intended 
signal is sent to the appropriate parties. 
b. Three types of foreclosure moratoria are considered. 
1. Voluntary nonforeclosure. This is a voluntary agree-
ment by lenders to refrain from foreclosure proceed-
ings for a certain period of time. The agreement is 
not legally binding, but a "good faith" attempt on the 
part of the lenders to involve their customers in seek-
ing financial alternatives other than foreclosure. The 
consequent legal and economic effects depend upon 
lender compliance. A voluntary nonforeclosure in-
volves little government action. 
2. Conditional moratorium. An objective of a condi-
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tional moratorium is to place restrictions on a 
lender's ability to foreclose. A conditional morato-
rium may be structured such that conditions other 
than nonrepayment be met before a stay on foreclo-
sure proceedings can occur. A conditional morato-
rium might encourage lenders and borrowers to 
cooperate in investigating alternatives to foreclosure. 
3. Mandatory moratorium. A mandatory moratorium 
is a legally binding action which requires lenders to 
stop all foreclosure proceedings. Unlike a condi-
tional moratorium, no preconditions are involved. A 
mandatory moratorium must be put in place either 
through legislative action or by executive order. 
II. Foreclosure Moratorium History 
a. Foreclosure Moratoria in Minnesota, 1930's. 
On February 23, 1933 Governor Floyd B. Olson issued a 
proclamation halting all mortgage sales until May 1, justi-
fying his actions on the grounds [sic] that violence 
threatened the state. Confusion over its application re-
sulted. Legislative action followed in the form of a mort-
gage moratorium law. This law provided for the 
postponement of certain real estate mortgage foreclosure 
sales and validating the acts of sheriffs in postponing cer-
tain real estate mortgage foreclosure sales; (Chapter 44--
H.F. 1779). The moratorium period was not to exceed 
ninety days. 
b. Frazier-Lemke Act of the 1930's (Sec. 75(s), Chapter 
VIII, U.S. Bankruptcy Laws: Provisions of Relief of 
Debtors). 
Foreclosure moratoria applied under the Frazier-Lemke 
Act pertained only to farm real estate loans. Under this 
Act, a farm was appraised by the court and a three year 
moratorium was granted. The farmer maintained posses-
sion of the property, paid rent for its use, and continued 
to farm. Within three years the farmer could pay the ap-
praised value and redeem the property. If not redeemed 
it was sold. The farmer was not held liable for loan 
amounts greater than the lesser of the appraised value or 
its sale price. The Act gave courts the power to force 
creditors and borrowers to work out their differences. 
Relatively few farmers used the provisions of the Act. 
Those who used it did so only when they thought they 
had assets worth saving. Use generally increased as gen-
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eral economic conditions improved (Munger and Feder, 
1943). 
c. 1983-Minnesota Mortgage and Contract for Deed Mor-
atorium Act (Minn. Stat. Ch. 583, 1983). 
This law permits mortgagors of residential or agricultural 
homesteaded property to petition the district court to 
postpone foreclosure proceedings for up to six months on 
residential property, or up to twelve months on agricul-
tural property. A contract for deed holder may request 
that contract termination be delayed up to 90 days. 
The court may consider the following criteria in deciding 
whether to delay the sale or foreclosure: 
(1) that the petitioner is unemployed, underemployed or 
facing economic problems due to low commodity 
prices; and/or 
(2) that the petitioner has an inability to make payments 
on the mortgage or contract for deed. 
The law applies only to first mortgages. It does not apply 
to mortgages or contracts for deed made after May 24, 
1983 or those made before May 24, 1983, for a period 
longer than one year, or to mortgages or contracts for 
deed if a second or subsequent mortgage is made against 
the property after May 24, 1983. 
d. 1984 Mortgage Moratorium Extension (Minn. Stat. Ch. 
583, 1984). 
This action extended the 1983 Minnesota Mortgage and 
Contract for Deed Moratorium Act. Provisions of the 
law scheduled to expire May 1, 1984 were extended to 
May 1, 1985. 
e. 1985 Extension of Existing Foreclosure Protection (Minn. 
Stat. Ch. 583, 1985). 
The provisions of the Minnesota Mortgage and Contract 
for Deed Moratorium Act were again extended. The ex-
piration date of the existing law is extended for two years, 
from July 1, 1985 to August 1, 1987. 
f. Voluntary Moratorium on Minnesota Farm-Loan 
Foreclosures. 
A voluntary moratorium on farm real estate foreclosure 
was put into place on November 28, 1985. Lender groups 
calling for the voluntary action included the Independent 
Bankers of Minnesota, the Minnesota Bankers Associa-
tion, Norwest Banks, First Bank Systems, and Farm 
Credit Services. The Farmers Home Administration did 
not participate. The voluntary agreement is not legally 
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binding. Lenders are urged to participate and refrain 
from foreclosure proceedings until the end of February 
1986 (a 90-day period). The voluntary moratorium covers 
only farm real estate loans and does not cover operating 
or nonreal loans on chattel. During the 90-day period, 
voluntary mediators will work with borrowers and their 
lenders to assess the situation and seek alternatives to 
foreclosure. 
III. 1985-86 Foreclosure Moratorium Proposals 
a. Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium, the Berg Proposal 
(Senate, State of Minnesota, S.F. 85). 
This bill was to prohibit farm mortgage foreclosures and 
foreclosure sales on agricultural land for one year, and to 
prohibit repossession, foreclosure, and foreclosure sales 
on agricultural personal property for one year. The 
moratorium would cover agricultural production real es-
tate, security interests in agricultural crops and livestock, 
and all personal property used for agricultural produc-
tion. Repossession, foreclosure, or sale could not take 
place for one year unless 1) the debtor agreed in writing, 
or 2) the action followed a court order. 
The party to the mortgage or security interest could peti-
tion the U.S. District Court and show why the reposses-
sion, foreclosure, or sale should proceed. If the court 
ruled that the action should proceed, it could postpone 
the repossession, foreclosure, or sale for up to one year if 
it found: 
(1) that a mortgagor or debtor was unable under all rea-
sonable circumstances to make payments; and 
(2) that there was reasonable prospect that postpone-
ment would enable the mortgagor or debtor to re-
cover and continue farming into the foreseeable 
future. 
The proposal also included a stipulation requiring 5 other 
states first to pass foreclosure moratorium legislation. 
Berg's proposal passed the Senate but was defeated by the 
House. 
The Berg proposal was eventually attached to another 
proposal introduced by Dicklich and Johnson (Senate, 
State of Minnesota, S.F. 77), which was also defeated. 
b. Independent-Republican Senate Caucus Plan (November 
12, 1985). (Included as part of an eight-point program). 
The IR caucus proposes a three-month moratorium on 
foreclosure of agricultural property to be imposed by the 
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legislature. That legislation would provide that the mora-
torium may be extended for four consecutive three-month 
periods, up to a total of 15 months. The extension would 
be by gubernatorial declaration at the time the then-cur-
rent moratorium expires. The Governor could declare 
extensions of the moratorium, taking into consideration 
whether: 
( 1) farm land values had stabilized; 
(2) farmers and lenders were making reasonable efforts 
to restructure debt obligations or utilize alternative 
financing; 
(3) the moratorium was having a substantially negative 
impact on the availability of credit in the farming 
community; and 
( 4) appropriate federal action had been taken. 
The moratorium would apply to mortgages on agricul-
tural property, but not contracts for deed. 
c. Humphrey Proposal, 'Farmer-Lender Mediation Act.' 
The Humphrey proposal would establish a Farmer-
Lender Mediation Commission, made up of the Commis-
sioners of Agriculture, Commerce, and Finance, and 
three-person Farm Mediation Boards in each of eleven 
administrative regions in Minnesota. 
Under the proposal, voluntary and mandatory mediation 
between farm borrowers and their lenders would take 
place in front of the Mediation Boards. Borrowers or 
lenders could petition the Commission for voluntary me-
diation. Mandatory mediation would be required when a 
lender sought to initiate proceedings against agricultural 
property for a mortgage foreclosure, termination of con-
tract for deed, or repossession of property. If no agree-
ment was reached, the Board must recommend to the 
Mediation Commission whether to postpone the lender's 
actions. If postponement is ordered, the lenders can not 
take any further action against the borrower for up to one 
year. If no postponement is ordered, the lender may be-
gin the foreclosure or other proceedings. 
If postponement is ordered, the Board would have thirty 
days to develop a financial plan requiring Commission ap-
proval. Postponement could be rescinded if the borrower 
does not cooperate with the financial plan. 
d. Proposal by Senator Moe (Speech November 16, 1985 to 
Independent Bankers Association). 
Senator Moe [of the Minnesota Legislature] proposed a 
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90-day moratorium, through executive order by the Gov-
ernor. It would apply to all foreclosures affecting farm 
operations. If the courts later ruled that such an order 
requires legislative action, he would then ask the Gover-
nor to call a special session to seek necessary approval. 
Moe did not recommend a roll-over option for renewal. 
He also recommended that the legislature develop and 
implement a more long range solution in the next regular 
session. 
IV. Issues Relevant to a Foreclosure Moratorium in Minnesota 
a. Historical evidence. In the 1930's foreclosure moratoria 
were imposed in 25 states, including Minnesota. Subse-
quent analysis has shown that these actions resulted in 
significantly restricted access to farm credit, as lenders 
tightened credit eligibility requirements and "rationed" 
credit to selected customers previously deemed 
creditworthy (Alston, 1984). No significant change in in-
terest costs was found (Alston, 1984). The moratoria 
postponed some foreclosures but most likely stopped very 
few (Perkins, 1969, Woodruff, 1937). The average annual 
effects of Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) programs, 
federal credit programs, and state moratoria legislation 
during the period 1933-40 have been estimated by Rucker 
and Alston (1985). State moratorium legislation was 
found to be less effective in reducing farm failures than 
AAA and federal credit programs. 
b. Coverage. Should a moratorium cover farm real estate, 
nonfarm real estate, contracts for deed, and other assets, 
or only some of these? Should it apply to the entire agri-
culture sector or just to farmers? Should it cover all farm-
ers or only selected farmers? Should coverage depend on 
the type of debt? Should the moratorium be mandatory, 
conditional, or a voluntary nonforeclosure? 
c. Economic impact on lenders. A conditional or mandatory 
moratorium prevents lenders from exercising some or all 
of their rights to liquidate collateral. In a voluntary 
nonforeclosure lenders typically agree not to exercise their 
right to foreclose. 
A lender's inability to liquidate collateral results in fore-
gone income. There is an opportunity cost associated 
with this inability to reinvest those funds and obtain a 
higher return. Foregone income reduces gross earnings 
and profits. Reduced earnings may reduce the equity cap-
ital of the lender if losses are realized or if agricultural 
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losses are not offset by interest income on other loans or 
investments. 
A lender may realize unanticipated capital losses if the 
market value of collateral falls below the outstanding loan 
principal. A foreclosure moratorium during a period of 
declining asset values is expected to increase capital losses 
of farm lenders. Since composition of the capital base and 
provisions for loss sharing differ between commercial 
banks and Farm Credit Services, the effects of capital 
losses on lenders will vary. Eventually, capital losses will 
be passed on to borrowers. Additionally, banks differ in 
their levels of capitalization and would likely differ in the 
level of risk exposure. The inability of lenders to liquidate 
collateral assets and the potential for reduction in capital 
would make lenders (particularly commercial banks heav-
ily involved in agriculture) more vulnerable to financial 
failure. 
d. Economic impact on borrowers. The impact of a foreclo-
sure moratorium on borrowers is reflected in interest 
costs, credit availability, and credit redistribution. 
1. Interest costs. Although foreclosure moratoria of the 
1930's were found to have no significant effects on in-
terest rates (Alston, 1984), circumstances today differ 
from those of the 1930's. There is sufficient evidence 
about the magnitude of interest cost effects. Move-
ment from a mandatory moratorium towards a condi-
tional moratorium or voluntary nonforeclosure is 
likely to reduce upward pressure on interest costs, es-
pecially for high-risk borrowers. 
2. Credit availability. A distinction should be drawn be-
tween farm and rural nonfarm sectors when consider-
ing the impact of a moratorium on credit availability. 
The rural nonfarm sector could expect some addi-
tional credit availability if funds are transferred out of 
the farm sector but not out of rural areas. A volun-
tary nonforeclosure will likely have little impact on 
credit availability. Either a conditional or mandatory 
moratorium is expected to reduce credit availability 
to the farm sector and increase it to the rural non-
farm sector. Previous experience indicates that a 
lender's expectation of further moratorium actions 
and potential applications to other forms of debt (e.g., 
nonreal estate loans) will result in a decrease in credit 
available to the farm sector (Alston, 1984). 
1986] MORTGAGE MORATORIA 341 
3. Credit redistribution. Given the current financial sit-
uation, lenders will likely reevaluate each problem 
borrower's repayment capacity in an effort to reduce 
future delinquencies. Farm loan eligibility require-
ments will also likely change. Credit will be redis-
tributed based on the lender's reevaluation. Some 
marginal borrowers would become ineligible for addi-
tional credit (Alston, 1984). Movement from a vol-
untary nonforeclosure to a conditional or mandatory 
moratorium will accelerate a redistribution of credit 
away from high-risk farm borrowers. 
e. Economic impact on land markets. The impact of a fore-
closure moratorium on land markets is uncertain. A 
mandatory moratorium is expected to hold some real es-
tate off the market (primarily "forced sales" or disposal of 
additional acquired properties). Effective demand for 
farm land is currently quite low, and unlikely to be appre-
ciably affected by a moratorium. Due to this condition 
land prices may not be changed by relatively small adjust-
ments in supply. 
f. Impact on lender/borrower relations. A mandatory fore-
closure moratorium is likely to lead to deterioration in re-
lations between selected lenders and borrowers. With a 
conditional moratorium, the courts may require lenders 
and borrowers to investigate alternatives to foreclosure. 
A voluntary nonforeclosure (like the one just initiated in 
Minnesota) creates incentives for borrowers and lenders 
to work toward alternatives to foreclosure. 
Both conditional and mandatory moratoria are likely to 
increase court costs because of the additional legal pro-
ceedings involved (Harl, et al., 1985). 
g. Effects of "buying time". A foreclosure moratorium may 
be a measure to buy time until financial conditions im-
prove or other action is taken (through state legislation, 
executive order, or federal intervention). This outcome 
depends critically on a quick turnaround in the agricul-
tural economy (see Boehlje, 1985, FAPRI, 1985 and 
Runge, 1985). A voluntary nonforeclosure or conditional 
moratorium may produce some success in "buying time" 
if lenders and borrowers can develop alternatives to fore-
closure during the moratorium. A mandatory morato-
rium does not facilitate the working out of alternatives. 
h. Other impacts. 
1. Anticipatory foreclosures: A mandatory moratorium, 
342 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:331 
if anticipated, may stimulate increased foreclosures 
as lenders seek to "get in under the wire." This 
would not be the case with a voluntary action since 
lenders retain the right to foreclose. One important 
question involves whether the foreclosure morato-
rium would apply to all foreclosure actions or only to 
those which would have been initiated during the 
moratorium period. 
2. Lifting the moratorium. If no other action has been 
taken, or economic conditions have not sufficiently 
improved, some foreclosures may have been averted, 
but many will have only been postponed. If a debt 
reduction program were initiated during the morato-
rium, financial adjustments may have taken place and 
some foreclosures would have been averted. 
3. Legal aspects. Voluntary nonforeclosure involves few 
legal questions, since no public action is required. 
Both conditional and mandatory moratoria involve 
complicated legal issues. These issues include the 
constitutionality of a moratorium and its relation to 
other aspects, such as banking regulations. Another 
issue arises as to whether the moratorium applies to 
FmHA and Farm Credit Service loans. 
4. Compatability with other actions. A foreclosure 
moratorium must be compatible with other policy in-
terventions, or its usefulness will be diminished. An 
example is the use of a mandatory foreclosure mora-
torium at the same time as an interest rate buy-down. 
A mandatory moratorium would likely adversely af-
fect the availability, cost, and redistribution of credit. 
This diminishes the effectiveness of interest rate buy-
down programs. (Farm Subcommittee, Economic 
Crisis Commission, 1985). 
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APPENDIX 1. Minnesota Statutes 1985 
Chapter 541, Limitations of Time, Commencing Actions 
541.03 FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE. 
343 
Subdivision 1. Limitation. No action or proceeding to fore-
close a real estate mortgage, whether by action or advertisement or 
otherwise, shall be maintained unless commenced within 15 years 
from the maturity of the whole of the debt secured by the mortgage, 
and this limitation shall not be extended by the non-residence of any 
plaintiff or defendant or any party interested in the land upon which 
the mortgage is a lien in any action commenced to foreclose such 
mortgage, nor by reason or any payment made after such maturity, 
nor by reason of any extension of the time of payment of the mort-
gage or the debt or obligation thereby secured or any portion 
thereof, unless such extension shall be in writing and shall have 
been recorded in the same office in which the original mortgage is 
recorded, within the limitation period herein provided, or prior to 
the expiration of any previously recorded extension of such mort-
gage or debt, nor by reason of any disability of any party interested 
in the mortgage. 
Subd. 2. When time begins to run; commencement of pro-
ceedings. The time within which any such action or proceeding 
may be commenced shall begin to run from the date of such mort-
gage, unless the time of the maturity of the debt or obligation se-
cured by such mortgage shall be clearly stated in such mortgage. 
Any action or proceeding to foreclose a real estate mortgage, 
whether by action, by advertisement, or otherwise, commenced 
within the period of limitation herein provided, may be prosecuted 
to completion notwithstanding the expiration of the period of limi-
tation, and proceedings to foreclose a real estate mortgage by adver-
tisement shall be deemed commenced on the date of the first 
publication of the notice of sale. 
History: 1909 c 181 s 1, 2 (9188, 9189) 
Chapter 580, Real Estate Mortgages; Foreclosure, Advertisement 
580.01 LIMITATION. 
Subject to the provisions of section 541.03, any mortgage or 
real estate containing a power of sale, upon default being made in 
any condition thereof, may be foreclosed by advertisement. 
History: RL s 4457; 1953 c 277 s 1 (9602) 
580.02 REQUISITES FOR FORECLOSURE. 
To entitle any party to make such foreclosure, it is requisite: 
(1) That some default in a condition of such mortgage has 
occurred, by which the power to sell has become operative; 
344 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:331 
(2) That no action or proceeding has been instituted at law to 
recover the debt then remaining secured by such mortgage, or any 
part thereof, or, if the action or proceeding has been instituted, that 
the same has been discontinued, or that in execution upon the judg-
ment rendered therein has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in 
part; 
(3) That the mortgage has been recorded and, if it has been 
assigned, that all assignments thereof have been recorded; provided, 
that, if the mortgage is upon registered land, it shall be sufficient if 
the mortgage and all assignments thereof have been duly registered. 
History: RL s 4458 (9603) 
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